The hypothesis that the areal size o f political units is inversely related to the settlement intensity of the regions in which they are located was developed and tested in an earlier work dealing with U.S. counties. Further support for this hypothesis, though tentative, is suggested in this analysis of data on the primary political divisions of ninety-eight nations.
I N a previous article in this review I
showed that the areal size of counties in the United States was inversely related to the settlement intensity of their region, at least from 1790 until the 1920s,when the automobile appeared. I related this finding to Durkheim's (1933) implicit theory of the growth of territorial organization and to two recent models of geopolitical structure developed by Stinchcombe (1968) and Boulding (1968) . The purpose of the present research was to test the generalizability of the earlier findings, to find whether variations in size of other nations' political units might be similarly related to variations in settlement density.
If the theory of segmental growth is generally applicable, we would expect smaller units to appear in regions of higher population density; that is, we would expect to observe a negative relationship between size and density in each nation studied. Two such findings have already been reported: the geographer Peter Haggett ( 1965:54) found such a relationship for a sample of counties in the Brazilian state of Santa Catarina, and the anthropologist William Skinner (1964:34) reported a similar finding for market areas in rural mainland China. The data obtained for this study were drawn from a standard reference, the Britannica World Atlas (1967: 198-272) , which gives area and population figures for the primary political divisions of the ninetyeight nations listed in Table 1 . Nations for which such data were not available were generally too small to have primary political divisions; in addition, for several larger countries (e.g., Republic of Congo, Liberia, Libya) the data were incomplete. The kinds of units found in various countries differ greatly. In some cases they are nearly autonomous units of local or regional government; in others they are merely administrative districts for the central or national government. Detailed descriptions of the role of such units in each nation studied may be found in Sachs, 1967 . The units studied also vary greatly in size: some average only a few hundred square kilometers, while others exceed an average of a hundred tliousand square kilometers. Thus the study compares not only nations, but different types of primary political divisions. This seems appropriate since Durkheim's original theoretical statement (1933 :186) seemed to apply to any kind of territorial organization: counties, communes, provinces, shires, departments, etc.
For comparative purposes the area data drawn from the Atlas were converted, where necessary, to square kilometers; and both area and density figures were expressed in common logarithms for preliminary data plotting. They were then analyzed to deter-tween size and density was found in ninetymine the regression coefficient b in the equa-four of the ninety-eight nations in the study. tion log A = K + b log D. The hypothesis, In seventy-eight the relation was significant that b would be negative, was tested using beyond the .05 level. Furthermore, none of the standard one-tailed t-test with K --2 the four positive relationships reported degrees of freedom. Results of the analysis (Haiti, Italy, Malawi and Yugoslavia) was appear in Table 1. significant a t the .05 level. Thus, for the The hypothesized negative relationship be-whole set the hypothesis appears to be con- I c e l a n d 5 n . s . U.S.S.R. I n d i a 1 6 n . s . U.A.R. I n d o n e s i a 23 .0005 U n i t e d Kingdom I r a n 1 9 .05 U n i t e d S t a t e s I r a q 1 4 .0005 Uraguay I r e l a n d 2 6 .05 Venezuela I s r a e l 1 8 .0005 Yugoslavia I t a l y 1 9 .10 Zambia I v o r y C o a s t 4 . 0 1 J a p a n 4 6 .0005
World T H E SIZE-DENSITY HYPOTHESIS firmed: as density increases, size decreases. I t is difficult to generalize about cases where the relationship was not significant, except that in most the number of political divisions was small and/or population density varied little to begin with. In several (e.g., the United Kingdom) it may be that boundaries which once reflected the population distribution have been maintained despite later population shifts. I t may be argued that the hypothesis of a negative relationship between area and density is not a substantive one since density contains area in its denominator (density = population/area) . Snedecor (1946: 162) has noted, however, that "one may gain information from correlating XI with X2/X1." As he points out:
Having observed some unwarranted interpretations of such correlations, Karl Pearson dubbed them 'spurious,' and this rather derogatory title has led people to distrust them. Of course, it is the interpretation that may be spurious. The correlations are on the same footing as any others. . . .
In order to avoid a spurious interpretation of the results re~orted. their relation to the theory of segmental growth must be discussed further; they do not, in fact, support the theory conclusively. The problem comes down to this: if heavily settled regions do conk~in small political units, then size and density will be negatively related-but the converse is not necessarily true.
We can conclude from the reported negative relationships that we have failed t o reject &he theory of segmental growth; they do not conclusively support the theory. The problem is that simple area and density relationships fail to account for the location of a unit in a densely settled region (e.g., the location of New Jersey in the mid-Atlantic region or Arizona in the southwest) ; they relate area and density only and thus are subject to criticism unless the added locational and regional information is supplied. If people in a densely settled region, like the mid-Atlantic, drew boundaries to form large political units, or if people in a lightly settled region, like the southwest, drew boundaries to form small political units, the size-density hypothesis (and theory of segmental growth) could be reiected. The results in Table 1 allow us to conclude merely that this seems not to be the case. Additional work, perhaps using some measure of "population potential" in place of "density," (cf., Anderson, 1970) , might yield more positive conclusions. Note that density maps for several countries (e.g., the United States, Japan, China, Brazil, Sweden and Norway) do seem to support the theory-such maps show smaller political units located in densely settled regions and larger units in more lightly settled regions.
To reduce the individual findings in Table  1 to some general form, all 1764 subdivisions were aggregated and analyzed as a set, for signs of an overall pattern. The results of this analysis appear in the last line of Table  1 , from which we can obtain an expression for the "world regression line": log A = 5.0684 -.66 log D. My question then was whether the reported regression coefficients in the set of nations differ significantly from the -0.66 value reported for the aggregate. To test this hypothesis I used Lehman's procedure ( 1959:284-285) for testing whether a set of regression lines have equal slopes. With 1568 and 97 degrees of freedom, the value of F (=4.11) was significant beyond the .01 level, so the hypothesis that the slopes did not differ had to be rejected. Still, the test's number of degrees of freedom was very large.
Individual t-tests for each country, testing whether its regression coefficient differed significantly from the -0.66 values of the aggregate, showed that seventy-six of the ninety-eight nations had no significant difference beyond the .05 level. In eight nations the regression coefficient was significantly "less negative" than the aggregate's (Ceylon, Dominican Republic, France, Italy, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia). In fourteen nations the slope was significantly "more negative" than the aggregate's (Congo, Czechoslovakia, West Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone and Sudan). Thus, it may be that the "world regression line" does describe some meaningful average tendency to relate size and density, but that other variable(s) may determine the actual slope in specific cases; what these variables might be is not evident from this grouping of countries which deviate from the average tendency.
Finally, regardless of the above, scatter diagrams for each nation in the study show remarkable convergence along the plotted world regression line. That is, although Italy, for example, shows a "significantly different" positive relationship, the pointcoordinates of size and density for its political units show little spread; in fact, they cluster very nearly on the aggregate line. While it is not feasible here to reproduce all ninety-eight scatter diagrams, I can report my own general impression that the line described by the aggregate does seem to fit the scatter diagrams of the individual nations fairly well.
While inconclusive this study does suggest a relationship between a nation's population distribution and variation in size of its political units. Whether this relationship is spurious, or depends on some measure df distribution other than density, only further study will reveal. I suggest the need for such study, and conclude that these international tests of the size-density hypothesis have failed to reject the theory of segmental growth and thus eliminated one empirical possibility,
